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INTRODUCTION 
	
 Historically, there has been little incentive for healthcare and 
pharmaceutical corporations to adhere strictly to federal 
administrative regulations. The monetary penalties, while in the 
billions of dollars, have paled in comparison to the profits reaped by 
the unlawful marketing, off-label usages, and fraudulent billing to 
federal healthcare programs. In 2015, former Attorney General, 
Sally Yates, issued the now famous Yates Memorandum to take the 
first step in curbing this trend of corporate misconduct. Through this 
memorandum, the Department of Justice reaffirmed its commitment 
to prosecuting not only corporations, but to hold their executives 
personally liable for regulatory violations committed under their 
watch. On paper, this is an attainable goal. In reality, federal 
prosecutors have been faced with seemingly insurmountable 
difficulties of proving executive intent and knowledge, overcoming 
attorney-client corporate privilege, and ultimately, convincing juries 
that are reluctant to convict corporate individuals for the crimes of 
their company. This note will examine the history of criminal 
prosecution of corporate executives which gave rise to the need for 
the Yates Memorandum, it will analyze the Yates Memorandum and 
explore the expanding impact of the document, and, finally, discuss 
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potential solutions to the numerous challenges faced by federal 
prosecutors in accomplishing the goals of the Yates Memorandum. 
This Note will argue that despite the mounting challenges of 
implementation and prosecution of corporate officers, there are 
viable solutions to give teeth to the original purpose of the Yates 
Memorandum and curb corporate misconduct. 
 
I. FOUNDATION OF THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER 
DOCTRINE 
 
The “Responsible Corporate Officer” doctrine (RCO 
doctrine), also described as the “crime of doing nothing,”2 is a 
procedural process that regulators and Federal prosecutors are now 
applying against corporate executives in administrative, civil, and 
even criminal actions.3 The RCO doctrine is aptly categorized as a 
crime of doing nothing because, at its core, the doctrine focuses on 
the “person’s position in an entity as the basis for imposing liability 
and not whether he or she had a culpable intent, was aware of any 
wrongdoing, or had any direct involvement whatsoever.”4 More 
recently, courts are applying the theory of liability in the public 
health and welfare context.5 It has been expanded in scope to 
encapsulate a wider range of regulatory violations and crimes. 
Along with a wider scope comes a wider range of applications that 
can result in harsher, criminal exposure for individuals. 
Today, the Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine effects 
not only the top brass of the corporate suite, but reaches out to a 
wide range of corporate management. The RCO doctrine can impose 
felony criminal charges on officers and exposure for the acts of their 
subordinates within the corporation. This reality remains true even 
though the officer did not intend for the bad acts to occur or was 
consciously aware of the regulations that were being violated.6 
Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court stated in 
Morissette v. United States, “[c]rime, as a compound concept, 
generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning 
mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense 
																																																						
2 Brent J. Gurney, et al., Commentary, The Crime of Doing Nothing: Strict Liability for 
Corporate Officers Under the FDCA, 22 Andrews Litigation Reporter 1 (West 2007), 
available at 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/Editorial/
Publication/The%20Crime%20of%20Doing%20Nothing.pdf. 
3 M.E. Clark, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, Duane Morris LLP (Jan. & 
Feb. 2012), 
http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/clark_healthcarecompliance_0112.pdf.. 
4 Id. at 5. 
5 D.E. Frulla, et al., Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: Strict Criminal Liability for 
Regulatory Violations, Kelley Drye (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/1771/_pdf/style=pdf/articles_1771.pdf. 
6 Id. 
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individualism and took deep and early root in American Soil.”7 It is 
important to note the deviation from the historical notion of criminal 
prosecution in American jurisprudence. The vast majority of 
criminal offenses require the unity of the bad act, actus reus, and 
bad intent, mens rea. Here, however, the legislature has created a 
discrete subset of offenses based on violation of administrative 
regulation relating to public health and welfare. These offenses, 
notably, lack the mens rea elements, but instead operate as strict 
liability offenses.8 The RCO doctrine is not a newcomer to 
American jurisprudence, but instead has been a slow build from its 
incipience in United States v. Dotterweich. 
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court, in United States 
v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), granted certiorari to address 
whether a corporate executive had to have personal knowledge of 
regulatory violations to be held criminally responsible.9 The 
defendant was the president of a corporation which purchased drugs 
from manufacturers, repackaged them, and then shipped them out to 
physicians under their corporate label.10 On at least two occasions, 
the labels for the drugs were incorrect and thus the corporation was 
prosecuted for criminal violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) §§ 301-392. At the end of the proceedings, 
the jury reached their verdict in which they acquitted the 
corporation, but found Dotterweich guilty. He was sentenced to 
probation for 60-days and a fine.  
The United States Supreme Court upheld his conviction and 
stated, “legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for 
criminal conduct – an awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest 
of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a 
person otherwise innocent, but standing in responsible relation to a 
public danger.”11 The Supreme Court’s impact went far beyond the 
holding in this singular case. Their reasoning stated that “Congress 
could place a great burden on corporate officers to comply with 
regulation that directly affect public health and welfare.12 Criminal 
liability, for the violation of an administrative regulation, stretches 
to all those having “such a responsible share in the furtherance of 
the transaction which the statute outlaws.”13 The next stage in the 
development of the RCO doctrine came into being when the 
Supreme Court decided Morissette v. United States. 
Justice Jackson, in Morissette, stated technological and 
society advances following the Industrial Revolution have yielded, 
																																																						
7 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1952). 
8 Id. 
9 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943). 
10 Id. at 281. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 284-85. 
13 See Gurney, supra note 2, at 3 (citing Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284). 
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“dangers [that] have engendered increasingly numerous and detailed 
regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of 
particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public 
health, safety or welfare.” 342 U.S. at 253-54. “Justice Jackson 
further explained, ‘[m]any of those are not in the nature of positive 
aggression or invasions, with which the common law so often dealt, 
but are in the nature of neglect where a duty requires care, or 
inaction where it imposes a duty.’”14 However, the Morissette Court 
was prudent to limit this new category of offenses to misdemeanors, 
with little to no risk of incarceration, rather than more serious felony 
offenses.15 
Finally, the Supreme Court decided the seminal case of 
United States v. Park in 1975.  In Park the Court, as in Dotterweich, 
faced a violation of FDCA. Park was the CEO of a national food 
chain. Over the course of three years, FDA inspectors found 
repeated contamination in several of the company’s food storage 
warehouses. Both the company and Park were charged with five 
misdemeanor counts under § 301(k) for causing the adulteration of 
food products being stored for later sale. The company plead guilty, 
but Park decided to go to trial. The trial court instructed the jury that 
in order to find Park guilty, the jury must find that he had “a 
responsible relationship” to the sanitary conditions in the company’s 
warehouses16. Further, the trial court stated that the primary question 
before the jury was whether Park, “by virtue of his position in the 
company, had a position of authority and responsibility in the 
situation out of which the charges arose.”17 The jury convicted Park 
of all counts. Following a reversal by the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s jury 
instructions noting that the “FDCA imposes not only a positive duty 
to seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also and 
primarily, a duty to implement measures that will insure that 
violations will not occur.”18 The Court concluded that “the 
government established a prima facie case… when it introduced 
evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of facts that the 
defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, 
responsibility and authority to prevent in the first instance, or 
promptly correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to 
do so.”19 In accordance with Park, and the RCO doctrine, a court 
could impute knowledge of administrative regulation, for strict 
liability offenses, and impose the corporate subordinate acts upon 
																																																						
14 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 256. 
15 Id. at 273. 
16 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 665 (1975). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 672. 
19 Id. at 673-74. 
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the responsible officer. Despite the growth in scope of the RCO 
doctrine, the Supreme Court has held firm to Morissette in that when 
an offense is punishable by a felony, the court should not presume 
knowledge on the defendant. “[T]hat because a felony carries a 
much harsher stigma, a court should be careful not to dispose of a 
felony mens rea requirement on the same basis as when applying the 
RCO doctrine.20” Currently, the federal government utilizes the 
RCO doctrine in an effort to change corporate culture and steer 
corporate conduct away from habitual regulation violations21.   In 
addition to levied charges, there has been a marked increase in the 
scale and in the amount of financial settlements, civil penalties, and 
criminal charges levied against both healthcare and pharmaceutical 
corporations and individual executives. 
 
II. HISTORY OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PENALTIES 
 
 The inability of paltry financial penalties to serve as a 
deterrent to further wrongdoing heightens the importance of other 
enforcement avenues.22 However, despite the plethora of 
settlements reached with the pharmaceutical industry under the 
False Claims Act (FCA), Department of Justice (DOJ) has, with a 
few exceptions, not held company heads accountable for overseeing 
the fraudulent activities at issue in the settlements.23  
 Public Citizen reported that in the period of 1991 through 
2015 there were 329 reported civil settlements, 35 civil-criminal 
settlements, and nine reported criminal settlements with $28 billion 
in civil penalties and $7.8 billion in criminal penalties.24 All of the 
reported criminal penalties, from 1991 through 2015, were federal 
and decreased exponentially over the last two years.25 When 
considered in totality between federal and state settlements, there 
was a total of 373 between 1991 through 2015. These settlements 
reached a total amount of roughly $35.7 billion. In 2012-13, 
combined criminal penalties totaled $7.2 billion but by 2014-15, the 
total had decreased 98% to just $44 million. There were two “civil-
criminal settlements” in 2014-15, down from nine in the previous 
year, and there have been no reported criminal settlements since 
2012.26 
																																																						
20 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618 (1994). 
21 See Frulla, supra note 5. 
22 Sammy Almashat, M.D., M.P.H., et al., Twenty-Five Years of Pharmaceutical Industry 
Criminal and Civil Penalties: 1991 Through 2015, PUBLICCITIZEN, at 25 (Mar. 31, 2016), 
available at https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/publiccitizen-
pharmasettlements1991-2015-chartbook.pdf. 
23 Id. at 25. 
24 Id. at 10. 
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
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 In the time period studied, Public Citizen totaled the amount 
of federal settlements at $31.9 billion, with just $2.4 billion in 
federal penalties recovered in 2014 and 2015. This amount, while 
substantial, is significantly reduced from the amount recovered in 
2012-2013, $8.7 billion. Likewise, the number of settlements 
decreased in the same time period from 22 in 2012-2013 to 19 
settlements in 2014-2015, with each averaging out to $395 million 
per settlement.27 It is important to note that half of the recovered 
settlements in 2014-2015, roughly $1.2 billion was due to one case 
in which the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) settled with Teva 
over alleged monopolistic practices28. Among the reported federal 
settlements, the False Claims Act was the most commonly invoked 
law in civil settlements, while the FDCA was the most commonly 
invoked law in criminal prosecution. Out of all the federal 
prosecutions, qui tam (whistleblower) revelations amounted for 81 
of 140 (58%) of all federal settlements and $22.8 of $31.9 billion 
(71%) of recovered penalties. 
 Through the end of 2014, the following cases resulted in 
guilty pleas by, or convictions of, executives of pharmaceutical 
companies. In 2007, three executives from Purdue Pharma pled 
guilty to “deceiving doctors and patients about the risks of lucrative 
painkiller Oxycontin” and paid a fine of $34.5 million29. In 2009, 
Former InterMune CEO, Scott Harkonen, was convicted for 
approving a press release which advertised Actimmune, one of the 
company’s drugs, for off-label uses. Harkonen was sentenced to six-
months home confinement and forced to pay $20,000 in fines30. In 
the same year, Thomas Farina and Mary Holloway, both operated as 
sales representatives for Pfizer, were convicted for promoting the 
painkiller Bextra for off-label uses. Farina was sentenced to six 
months of home confinement and Holloway to two-years probation 
and a $75,000 fine31. Finally, in 2011, former KV Pharmaceuticals 
CEO, Marc Hermelin, pled guilty to two misdemeanor charges 
under the FDCA and was ordered to pay the amount of $1.9 million 
in fines and forfeitures and sentenced to 30-days in prison, of which 
																																																						
27 Id. at 8. 
28 Id. 
29 Barry Meier. In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES (May 
10, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html.  
30 Greg Stohr. Ex-InterMune CEO Harkonen’s Conviction Let Stand by Court, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2013-
12-16/ex-intermune-ceo-harkonen-s-conviction-let-stand-by-court.  
31 Jim Edwards, Pfizer Exec Gets 6 Months’ Home Confinement for Off-Label Bextra 
Sales, CBS. NEWS (last updated July 20, 2009.), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pfizer-
exec-gets-6-months-home-confinement-for-off-label-bextra-sales. 
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he served 15, for “failing to report that some of his company’s 
tablets were oversized and possibly dangerous.”32 
 These reported data sets can only be considered to be the 
Olympics of corporate wrongdoing and settlements in the studied 
time period of 1991 through 2015. In that period, GlaxoSmithKline 
and Pfizer took gold and silver medals with $7.9 and $3.9 billion in 
settlements respectively. Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Abbott, Eli 
Lilly, Teva, Shering-Plough, Novartis, and AstraZeneca took home 
bronze and received honorable mentions with each paying penalties 
of at least $1 billion in the same time period. To the average person, 
settlements of this magnitude would appear to be enough to curb any 
future corporate wrongdoing, but this is not the case. In the time 
period covered in this study, the total financial penalties totaled 
roughly $35.7 billion. Consider that amount in comparison to the 
realized net profits of only the 11 largest pharmaceutical companies, 
$711 billion33. The amounts faced by corporations simply is not 
enough to deter the alleged regulatory violations. Consider the 
largest reported single settlement in the study.  
GlaxoSmithKline paid $3 billion for violations involving 
multiple of drugs. “On just the three drugs involved in the criminal 
plea agreement – Paxil, Wellbutrin SR, and Avandia – 
GlaxoSmithKline made $28 billion in sales, or nine times the total 
fines for all implicated products in the settlement.”34 The amount of 
penalties, even considering the largest monetary penalty faced, are 
doing little to curb regulatory violations or incentivize complete 
compliance with administrative regulation. Criminal prosecution of 
corporate executive and other employees resulting in prison 
sentences for the most egregious violations may be necessary and 
thus set the stage for Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates to issue 
her September 9, 2015 memorandum. 
 
III. THE YATES MEMORANDUM 
 
 In response to the growing concerns that pure financial 
penalties and settlements were doing little to effectively curb 
wrongdoing by healthcare and pharmaceutical corporations, Deputy 
Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates, on September 9, 2015, 
issued a memorandum on Individual Accountability for Corporate 
																																																						
32 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Drug Company Executive Pleads Guilty 
in Oversized Drug Tablets Case (last updated Sept. 15, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-drug-company-executive-pleads-guilty-oversized-
drug-tablets-case.  
33 See Almashat, supra note 22, at 23.  
34 Id. at 23-24. 
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Wrongdoing.35 The purpose of this memorandum was simple. Yates 
stated “Our nation’s economy depends on effective enforcement of 
the civil and criminal laws that protect our financial system and, by 
extension, all our citizens…One of the most effective ways to 
combat corporate misconduct is by seeking accountability from the 
individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing.” 36 Accountability of 
corporate executives, those who perpetrate, or should have known 
to prevent such wrongdoing, is important for several reasons. First, 
as Yates stated, accountability deters future illegal activity. It 
incentivizes changes in corporate behavior. It ensures that proper 
parties are held responsible for their actions. Finally, and most 
importantly, accountability promotes the public’s confidence in our 
justice system. 
 The challenge in realizing the goals set forth in this 
memorandum lie in that, in large corporations, responsibility can be 
diffuse and decisions are made throughout the corporations and at 
all levels of managerial authority. In such situations, it can be, and 
is, difficult to determine if an individual possessed the knowledge 
and requisite criminal intent to establish them personally “guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”37  This challenge is particularly true in 
regards to high level executives, who are often well insulated from 
the day-to-day operations of the corporation in which many of the 
violations occur.  
 The Yates Memorandum set out the framework from which 
federal prosecutors may face these challenges head on. Six key steps 
have been formulated to “strengthen [the] pursuit of individual 
corporate wrongdoing.” First, in order to qualify for any cooperation 
credit, “typically consists of reduced fines in civil or administrative 
cases or potential shorter sentences in criminal cases”38, 
corporations must provide to the Department all relevant facts 
relating to the individual responsible for the misconduct as criminal 
and civil investigations should focus on individuals from their 
inception. Criminal and civil attorneys handling corporate 
investigations should be in routine communications with one 
another. Absent extraordinary circumstances or approved 
departmental policy, the Department will not release culpable 
individuals from civil or criminal liability when resolving a matter 
with a corporation. Department attorneys should not resolve matters 
																																																						
35 Sally Quillian Yates, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, 
Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), 
http://src.bna.com/hg.  
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Jonathan C. Schwartz & David G. Buffa, Cooperation Credit in Enforcement 
Proceedings: The Importance of Independence, A.B.A. (Aug. 8, 2016), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/commercial/articles/summer2016-
0816-cooperation-credit-enforcement-proceedings-importance-of-independence.html.  
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with a corporation without a clear plan to resolve related individual 
cases, and should memorialize any declinations as to individuals in 
such cases. Finally, civil attorneys should consistently focus on 
individuals as well as the company and evaluate whether to bring 
suit against an individual based on consideration beyond that 
individual’s ability to pay.39  
 The government’s twin aims of this memorandum, of 
returning government money to the public and to hold the 
wrongdoers accountable and deter future violative actions, are 
equally important. However, the twin aims can come into apparent 
tension when a federal prosecutor is determining whether to levy 
civil charges against an individual who may not have sufficient 
personal resources to pay any financial penalty imposed. The goal 
of individual accountability supersedes the individual’s ability to 
pay. Yates clearly stated that, “[p]ursuit of civil actions against 
culpable individuals should not be governed solely by those 
individuals’ ability to pay.  
In other words, the fact that an individual may not have 
sufficient resources to satisfy a significant judgment should not 
control the decision on whether to bring suit. Rather, Department 
attorneys should consider the following factors. First, was the 
individual’s misconduct serious? Second, if so, is the misconduct 
actionable? Third, will the evidence admissible against the 
individual “probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a 
judgment.”40 Finally, ask whether pursuing the charge reflects an 
important federal interest.41 Only by seeking to hold all individuals 
accountable, in view of the above mentioned factors, can the 
Department of Justice ensure that it is “doing everything in its power 
to minimize corporate fraud, and, over the course of time, minimize 
losses to the public fisc through fraud.42 
 Under this new approach by the Department of Justice and 
Office of the Attorney General, corporations face increased pressure 
to comply with administrative regulations. Instead of the 
corporation and executives facing solely monetary penalties, and 
potential exclusion from participation in the Medicare and 
Medicaid, now corporate executives face potential criminal charges 
resulting in prison sentences. All of these measures are designed to 
deter future wrongdoing, incentivize long overdue changes to 
corporate behavior, and ensure that the proper parties are held 
responsible for violations. Just as Former Deputy General Yates 
stated, “Americans should never believe, even incorrectly, that 
																																																						
39 Yates, supra note 35, at 2-3.   
40 Id. at 7. 
41 Id.  
42 Id. 
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one’s criminal activity will go unpunished simply because it was 
committed on behalf of a corporation.”43 The impact of the 
memorandum was almost immediate with the first prosecution 
coming a short seven weeks after the publication of the 
memorandum. 
 
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE YATES MEMORANDUM 
 
 The Yates memorandum serves an important purpose in 
helping shape the future of corporate conduct, and specifically the 
future compliance with administrative regulation. As Eric Holder, 
Former Attorney General of the United States, stated, “few things 
discourage criminal activity at a firm – or incentivize changes in 
corporate behavior – like the prospect of individual decision makers 
being held accountable.”44 While corporations can plead guilty and 
have their stock prices return to profitable levels in a matter of time, 
executives that plead guilty can face years of incarceration. The 
Yates Memorandum marks a notable shift in policy. Executives can 
no longer protect themselves behind the veil of corporate limited 
liability, but instead face the full force of punishment both their 
personal and their corporation’s wrongdoing.45 The impact of the 
Yates memo, and challenges faced by federal prosecutors, will be 
examined in four notable cases. 
Historically, the Department of Justice punished healthcare 
and pharmaceutical companies with mammoth financial 
settlements, without actually holding the individuals charged with 
responsibility of such companies accountable. This was true until 
October, 29, 2015. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of 
Massachusetts announced that they had formally arrested the former 
president of Warner Chilcott, W. Carl Reichel on an indictment of 
conspiring to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute.46 The indictment 
charged Reichel with an allegedly integral role in Warner Chilcott’s 
																																																						
43 Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates Delivers Remarks 
at New York University School of Law Announcing New Policy on Individual Liberty in 
Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 10, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-
remarks-new-york-university-school.  
44 Eric Holder, Attorney General Holder Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at 
NYU School of Law, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 17, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-remarks-financial-fraud-
prosecutions-nyu-school-law. 
45 Dustin Aponte, et al., The Yates Memo and Big Pharma: Individual Prosecutions for 
Corporate Misconduct, ABA (Sept. 12, 2016), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/health/articles/summer2016-0916-
yates-memo-big-pharma-individual-prosecutions-corporate-misconduct.html.  
46 Gary Giampetruzzi, Not Guilty, Again: Individual Corporate Liability in the Wake of 
the Reichel Acquittal, PAUL HASTINGS LLP (June 22, 2016), 
https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=6cc9e969-2334-6428-811c-
ff00004cbded. 
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scheme to pay kickbacks, in the form of speaker fees, dinners, and 
other remunerations, for high volume of prescription of the 
company’s drugs.47 However, on the same day that the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office announced the arrest of Reichel, the office also 
announced that Warner Chilcott would pay a reported $125 million 
to settle both the civil claims and criminal charges levied against 
them.48  
The impact of the Yates memorandum is clear. In this 
instance, the corporation has formally settled the charges against it 
for a monetary penalty, but the U.S. Attorney’s Office continues to 
pursue independent criminal charges against the executive for his 
personal role in the wrongdoings. In announcing such an 
independent indictment, U.S. Attorney Carmen Ortiz stated the 
indictment “demonstrate[s] that the government will seek not only 
to hold companies accountable, but will identify and charge 
corporate officials responsible for the fraud.”49  
 At trial, the government asserted that there were two Warner 
Chilcott corporation, “one on paper that followed the law, and one 
which Reichel directed, that broke the law.”50 The government 
offered the testimony of ten former Warner Chilcott employees, 
several had pled guilty to federal charges and entered into plea 
agreements to cooperate with the government in exchange for the 
government’s recommendation that they receive lighter sentences.51 
Several of the witnesses testified to providing kickbacks to 
prescribing physicians and that it was Reichel who truly directed the 
operation.52 Additionally, the government stated that they wished to 
have the jury instructed on willful blindness in that “would have 
allowed [the jury] to find that Reichel knew a fact if he ‘deliberately 
closed his eyes to a fact that otherwise would have been obvious to 
him.’”53 Reichel objected and the court sustained in favor of jury 
instructions that read:  
 
Since an essential element of the offense is that it be 
undertaken “knowingly” and “willfully,” it follows 
																																																						
47 Indictment ¶ 9, United States v. Reichel, No. 1 1:15cr10324 (D. Mass. 2016). 
48 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Warner Chilcott Agrees to Plead Guilty to Felony Health Care 
Fraud Scheme, (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/warner-chilcott-agrees-
plead-guilty-felony-health-care-fraud-scheme-and-pay-125-million.) [hereinafter 
“Warner Chilcott Pleads”]. 
49 Indictment ¶ 9, United States v. Reichel, No. 1 1:15cr10324 (D. Mass. 2016). 
50 See Giampetruzzi, supra note 46 (citing Brian Amaral, Bribery Case Against Ex-
Warner Chilcott Exec Heads to Jury, LAW 360 (June 16, 2016), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/807929/bribery-case-against-ex-warner-chilcott-exec-
heads-to-jury). 
51 See Warner Chilcott Pleads, supra note 48. 
52 See Giampetruzzi, supra note 46. 
53 Government’s Proposed Instructions No. 21, United States v. Reichel, No 1:15cr10324 
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that good faith on the defendant is a complete 
defense. It is for you to decide whether or not the 
defendant acted in good faith, but if you decide that 
at all relevant times he acted in good faith, it is your 
duty to acquit him.54 
 
 Over the next two days, the jury deliberated and ultimately 
acquitted Reichel of all charges.55 As one commentator pointed out, 
“Had he been convicted, Reichel faced up to five years’ 
imprisonment and mandatory exclusion from all federal healthcare 
benefit programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid.”56 He further 
stated, “In a case that everyone seemed to be watching, and had a 
Yates imprint all over it, the government had come up short against 
an individual.”57 This case is a clear demonstration of the challenged 
faced by federal prosecutors in charging corporate individuals as 
they bear the burden of proof to establish both the executive’s 
knowledge and his or her intent to break the law. Despite this 
setback, the Department of Justice will not forgo prosecution of 
corporate executives, but will instead work to improve the quality 
of their evidence and sources of information, primarily the mandated 
corporate cooperation.58  
 In a similar case, GeneScience Pharmaceutical was 
investigated for a period of three years and ultimately was charged, 
along with the founder, Lei Jin.59 GeneScience pled guilty to a 
felony charge of illegally distributing human growth hormone in the 
United States.60  GeneScience was sentenced to pay a settlement of 
$3 million towards a clean competition fund, which supports drug-
free sports, and $7.2 million in criminal forfeitures.61 However, Lei 
Jin entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to 5 years’ probation.62 
 Another challenge faced by the Department of Justice when 
prosecuting corporate executives is not only the burden of proof, but 
also overcoming the hurdle of the attorney-client privilege. In 2011, 
GlaxoSmithKline made headlines when they agreed to plead guilty 
and pay a record $3 billion to resolve fraud allegations and failure 
to report safety data.63 In addition to corporate responsibility, 
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prosecutors alleged that a high-ranking attorney obstructed an FDA 
investigation into whether the company marketed one of their anti-
depressant drugs, Wellbutrin SR, for the off-label use of weight 
loss.64 Prosecution alleged that the attorney made false statements 
during an investigation in which she denied having any knowledge 
that the company was promoting the drug for such uses.65 The 
difficulty arises when prosecutors are attempting to prosecute an 
attorney representing a client for a criminal offense because the bulk 
of the communications between the attorney and client are 
privileged and cannot be compelled for disclosure. “While there 
have been a few drug company executives who have pled guilty to 
criminal and/or civil charges relating to the unlawful marketing of a 
product, this strategy of suing corporate executives, who almost 
always rely on the advice of their attorneys, is very problematic.”66  
 Following the Warner Chilcott case, federal prosecutors 
filed suit in a Massachusetts federal court against William Facteau, 
former CEO of Acclarent, and Patrick Fabian, former Vice President 
of Sales. Like many others, this case arose out of a qui tam suit filed 
under the federal False Claims Act by a former sales representative 
who worked for Acclarent from 2007 to 2011.67 The relator alleges 
that Acclarent received FCA clearance for its “Relieva Stratus 
MicroFlow Spacer” (Stratus) device, a device which utilized saline 
to open a patient’s sinuses following surgery.68 However, allegedly, 
this was not the true purpose of this device. Following FDA 
clearance, Facteau and Fabian intended to use Stratus as a drug-
delivery device and marketed Stratus for that purpose even after, in 
2007, when the FDA rejected the request to promote Stratus for such 
purposes.69 Following this rejection, the relator alleged that between 
2008 and 2011, Facteau and Fabian engaged in a scheme to develop 
and marked Stratus rapidly in order to generate sales and make the 
company, Acclarent, an overall desirable target for acquisition or an 
IPO.70  
 The relator further alleged that, as part of the scheme, sales 
employees were praised promotion and trained only in the off-label 
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use of the Stratus device and were encourages to discuss with 
physicians the benefits of the off-label uses of the device with 
steroids.71 Their efforts paid off and made them a desirable target 
for acquisition when in 2010, Johnson & Johnson acquired 
Acclarent for $785 million.72 Despite being told to discontinue the 
promotion of the Stratus device for off-label uses, Acclarent 
continued to promote the device and ultimately allegedly caused 
several doctors and other health care providers to bill federal health 
care programs for unapproved uses of the device. In May 2013, 
Acclarent made the decision to discontinue the use of the Stratus 
device. 
 Despite discontinuing the device, both Facteau and Fabian 
were indicted for “felony wire fraud and conspiracy, as well as a 
number of misdemeanor counts related to introducing a misbranded 
and adulterated device into interstate commerce.”73 The prosecution 
argued, at trial, that the two parties hid the truth of their device’s 
purpose from the FDA. The defense countered, and jury agreed, that 
they had not hid the truth, but had rather applied for several years to 
have the off-label use cleared by the FDA, but had not received any 
approval beyond the initial saline use. The jury agreed and acquitted 
them of the singular felony charge. “Facteau and Fabian did not 
escape trial unscathed, however, and were convicted on 10 
misdemeanor counts of introducing a misbranded and adulterated 
device into interstate commerce in violation of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.” 74 Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay $18 
million to resolve any civil allegations that it caused health care 
providers to submit false claims to the federal health care programs. 
 In the most recent, and ongoing, development of the Yates 
memorandum, a former senior executive of Tenet Healthcare Corp, 
John Holland, has been indicted on charges of participation in a 
scheme to bribe physicians for patient referrals, enabling the 
healthcare corporation to fraudulently bill Medicaid programs in 
excess of $400 million.75 Holland was senior vice president for 
Tenet’s southern states between 2006 and 2013 and has been 
accused by federal prosecutors of paying $12 million in kickbacks 
to Clinica de la Mama, a clinic serving predominately 
undocumented pregnant women in Georgia and South Carolina. In 
these states, the clinic referred expecting mothers to local Tenet 
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hospitals. In return, Tenet would bill Medicaid, and in some cases, 
Medicare, for the total of $149 million in reimbursement from the 
referrals.76 The indictment also alleges that Holland falsified 
compliance reports to the Department of Health and Human 
Services, violating Tenets previous 2006 settlement agreement in 
which Tenet agreed to pay $900 million for over inflating charges 
to Medicaid. Holland, facing four charges of mail fraud, health care 
fraud, and major fraud against the United States plead not guilty in 
federal court in Miami. 
 Holland is likely the first of several managers and executives 
at Tenet Healthcare to be charged. In the past year, Tenet Healthcare 
reached a $514 million settlement to resolve the criminal and civil 
claims that came from a whistle-blower lawsuit filed more than 10 
years ago. Richard Deane, attorney for Holland, stated that“[t]he 
allegations relate to contracts from more than 10 years ago that were 
openly reviewed and approved at multiple levels of the company, 
including by their lawyers, was released on a $3 million bond late 
Wednesday.”77 If convicted, John Holland could face up to 50 years 
in prison with his homes in Dallas and Park City also facing seizure. 
However, Holland’s attorney believes that his client is innocent, that 
the jury will find him so, and “the company’s resolution”, of the 
issue, “should have ended the matter.”78 Acting Assistant Attorney 
General, Blanco said that the “charges underscore our continued 
commitment to holding both individuals and corporations 
accountable for the fraudulent conduct. We will follow the evidence 
where it takes us, including to the corporate executive ranks.”79 
Although juries have not entirely sides against corporate executives 
in the various cases and charges levied against them, considered 
together, they raise questions about the willingness of juries to hold 
individuals personally accountable for the actions or wrongdoings 
of their companies, despite the government’s “recommitment to 
prosecuting individual’s as professed in the Yates Memo.”80 
 
V.  CONSIDERATIONS TO COMBAT THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF 
THE YATES MEMORANDUM 
 
 Laws without teeth are merely words. Historically, monetary 
penalties have done little to effectively curb the trend of corporate 
violation of federal administrative regulation from the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetics Act to the Anti-Kickback Statute. The billions 
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imposed as federal sanctions are written off as insignificant means 
to reach the end of realized exponential profits. The Yates 
Memorandum is sound in both idea and scope, but the goals and 
language have not been effectuated in the most efficient ways. The 
number of corporate senior executives that have been charged 
individually following the memo has grown. However, the number 
of convictions of criminal charges is small. It is more likely that a 
middle manager or sales representative will face the full force of 
criminal charges, and even jail sentences, than the majority of 
charged senior executives.  
The state of American healthcare and regulation is always in 
flux, but that has never been truer than now. While we are in the 
early stages of a new administration, it will be interesting, as time 
goes on, to see the impacts that will be made on the prosecution of 
corporate executives.  The following are considerations on what 
might be done to remedy the ineffectiveness found in the application 
of the Yates Memorandum. Time will tell whether future 
administrations will continue to pursue accountability by using the 
same methods or if they will make changes, from minor to major, to 
potentially empower prosecutors to fully perform all of the goals set 
forth in the memorandum. 
 The first potential solution to accomplish the goals set forth 
by the Yates memo is to further empower federal prosecutors. In 
doing so, it would be necessary to call for further cooperation by 
corporations involved in investigations. In order to qualify currently 
for the cooperation credit, a corporation must disclose to the 
Department of Justice all relevant facts about an individual’s 
misconduct. “The company must identify any individuals involved 
or otherwise responsible for the misconduct at issue, regardless of 
their position, status, or seniority, and provide to the Department all 
facts relating to that misconduct.”81 The revision should include 
further calls for corporate transparency and full disclosure. Federal 
prosecutors face the burden of often having to prove individual mens 
rea and actus reus without all of the necessary facts and as their 
cases have suffered as a result. By fully disclosing all relevant 
information to the misconduct at hand, and employees who are 
connected to such misconduct, federal prosecutors might be able to 
build stronger cases reinforced by this additional evidence which 
might be able to prove the intent and knowledge of corporate 
executives.  
By revising the current or issuing a new memorandum to 
reflect this first proposal, federal prosecutors might be empowered 
to overcome the challenges of acquiring sufficient evidence to hold 
individual corporate executives accountable. With more access to 
evidence, federal prosecutors will not only be able to better show 
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the knowledge of misconduct or intent of the corporate executive, 
but will also be able to better advocate their cause to the jury. As it 
has been noted previously, juries have shown a hesitancy to convict 
individuals for the wrongs of their companies. However, with 
enough information, stemming from full and transparent 
cooperation by corporations, juries will be better able to understand 
the role that executives play in the misconduct or why they should 
be held vicariously liable for the acts of the corporation that they 
knew, or should have known, were illegal. 
Finally, a more immediate proposal would be to revise the 
Department of Justice’s approach to monetary penalties. If the 
profits that can be made by the sale of pharmaceuticals or services 
billable to federal healthcare programs can justify the financial 
penalties imposed on the means utilized to realize them, as the cost 
of doing business, then it would be wise for the Department of 
Justice to seek, and impose, higher monetary settlement and 
sanctions against these violative corporations. If evidence fails to 
show cause or juries are too hesitant to hold individuals accountable 
for the wrongdoings of the corporation, then, perhaps, it is best left 
to the shareholders to rectify noncompliance. If the Department is 
able to advocate for and impose far higher monetary penalties, then 
it would be wise for shareholders, acting in the best interest of their 
investments, to remove habitually offending executives and 
managers who are threatening their return on investment by 
continually incurring billions of dollars in settlements for regulatory 
violations. 
